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Choice of law in federal jurisdiction after
Rizeq v Western Australia
James Stellios*
This article considers the impact of the High Court’s decision in Rizeq v
Western Australia on choice of law in federal jurisdiction. Section 79(1) of
the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), along with s 80 of that Act, have been seen as
central to choice of law when a court exercises federal jurisdiction. The High
Court’s decision in Rizeq has reconceptualised the operation of s 79(1) and,
while Rizeq was not a choice of law case, the High Court’s decision
undoubtedly has choice of law implications.
Introduction
In John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson1 five members of the High Court stated
that:
strictly the question that arises in matters of federal jurisdiction does not involve any
choice between laws of competing jurisdictions, but identification of the applicable
law in accordance with ss 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act [1903 (Cth)].2
This statement reflected two significant developments, accepted in Pfeiffer v
Rogerson, for choice of law in federal jurisdiction: first, the recognition that
federal jurisdiction coincided with a federal or national ‘law area’;3 and
second, that within that federal law area, the applicable law was to be
identified in accordance with ss 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
With respect to the second development, the Court’s decision settled
conflicting views about the relationship between ss 79 and 80, and their
relevance to the choice of law enquiry.
The High Court’s decision in Rizeq v Western Australia4 has
reconceptualised the purpose and operation of s 79(1) of the Judiciary Act. In
light of the Rizeq decision, the statement in Pfeiffer v Rogerson, and perhaps
the decision more broadly, requires revisiting. This article will explore the
impact of the decision in Rizeq on choice of law in federal jurisdiction.
Choice of law and federal jurisdiction in Australia
The States as law areas for choice of law purposes
The rules of private international law have needed adaptation to the system of
government created by the Constitution. The Constitution establishes a federal
* Professor, ANU Law School; Barrister, NSW Bar. The author was junior counsel for the
appellant in Rizeq v Western Australia (2017) 344 ALR 421.
1 (2000) 203 CLR 503 (‘Pfeiffer v Rogerson’).
2 Ibid 530 [53]. See also Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v Hatfield (2005) 223 CLR 251, 258 [8]
(‘Agtrack’).
3 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 514 [2].
4 (2017) 344 ALR 421 (‘Rizeq’).
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system of government along two axes: the horizontal and the vertical. Along
the horizontal axis are the States.5 For much of the 20th century, the States
were conceptualised, for private international law purposes, as separate
sovereign states. For example, as late as 1991, a majority of the High Court
said in McKain v RW Miller & Co (South Australia) Pty Ltd that:
To describe the States, as Windeyer J once described them,6 as ‘separate countries
in private international law’ may sound anachronistic. Yet it is of the nature of the
federation created by the Constitution that the States be distinct law areas whose
laws may govern any subject matter subject to constitutional restrictions and
qualifications.7
Under this conception, the selection of the applicable law depended upon the
common law choice of law rules applicable to foreign countries. Importantly,
the identification of the applicable choice of law rule was not directed by any
constitutional imperative, including the full, faith and credit command in s 118
of the Constitution.8
The decision of the Court in Pfeiffer v Rogerson radically affected this
private international law framework in two relevant respects. First, while the
States are to be understood as separate law areas for choice of law purposes,
it was said that they must be understood within the constitutional framework:
while the phrases ‘law area’ and ‘lex fori’, adapted from the lexicon of private
international law, may be used to identify each of the States and Territories which
comprise the geographical area of Australia, these expressions are to be understood
in the Australian federal context. Thus, each law area, if it be a State, is a component
of the federation and, if it be a Territory, is a Territory of the federation.9
As component parts of the federation, the States share sovereign power, and
s 118 indicates that they are not ‘foreign powers as are nation states for the
purposes of international law’.10
Second, in addition to the horizontal axis of law areas, there is also the
vertical axis. The Constitution creates the Commonwealth of Australia, and
the Court in Pfeiffer v Rogerson accommodated this federal tier of government
within the private international law framework by identifying it as a separate
‘law area’. This vertical dimension requires some further elaboration.
The Commonwealth as a law area for choice of law
purposes
Chapter III of the Constitution establishes the federal judicature. Section 71
identifies and vests the judicial power of the Commonwealth in the High
Court, lower federal courts and ‘such other courts as it invests with federal
jurisdiction’. Importantly, the ‘other courts’ are State courts that have been
5 Of course, the Territories also appear across the horizontal axis. However, for simplicity, I
will refer only to the States.
6 Pedersen v Young (1964) 110 CLR 162, 170.
7 (1991) 174 CLR 1, 36 (‘McKain’).
8 As had been suggested by other members of the Court at the time: eg, Breavington v
Godleman (1988) 169 CLR 41, 98 (Wilson and Gaudron JJ), 130 (Deane J) (‘Breavington’).
9 Pfeiffer v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 514 [2].
10 Ibid 534 [65].
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invested with federal jurisdiction. The nine matters in relation to which federal
jurisdiction may be, and substantially has been, vested in State courts are
identified in ss 75 and 76 of the Constitution. Even from a cursory glance at
those provisions, it can be seen readily that choice of law cases may arise in
a State court when that court is exercising federal jurisdiction. For example:11
• where the Commonwealth Government is a party to the claim, as was
the case in Blunden v Commonwealth,12 the matter to be determined
arises under s 75(iii) of the Constitution;13
• where the parties are residents of different States, or if one party is a
resident of one State and the other party is the government of another
State (as was the case in Sweedman v Transport Accident
Commission),14 the matter to be determined arises under the diversity
jurisdiction of s 75(iv) of the Constitution;15
• where a constitutional claim is made in the course of litigation, as
was the case in Pfeiffer v Rogerson itself, the matter to be determined
arises under s 76(i) of the Constitution;16 and
• where the litigation involves the determination of a claim arising
under a federal statute, as was the case in Agtrack (NT) Pty Ltd v
Hatfield,17 the matter to be determined arises under s 76(ii) of the
Constitution.18
In each of these cases, the choice of law exercise took place within federal
jurisdiction. And, importantly, the Court in Pfeiffer v Rogerson said that ‘with
respect to matters that fall within federal jurisdiction, the Commonwealth of
Australia is, itself, a law area’.19 Thus, when exercising federal jurisdiction, a
State court transcends its State law area and, instead, exercises jurisdiction in
this federal or national law area for choice of law purposes.
Choice of law in the federal law area
There is a clear hierarchy of sources of Australian law to be applied to resolve
a dispute in an Australian court:
• the Constitution applies by virtue of covering cl 5 to the Constitution,
and prevails over inconsistent Commonwealth, State and Territory
statutes. The common law must conform with constitutional
11 More extensive examples are provided by the Court in Pfeiffer v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR
503, 518–19 [18].
12 (2003) 218 CLR 330 (‘Blunden’).
13 Federal jurisdiction to determine the claim in Blunden was conferred on the ACT Supreme
Court by s 56 of the Judiciary Act.
14 (2006) 226 CLR 362 (‘Sweedman’).
15 Federal jurisdiction to determine the claim in Sweedman was conferred on the Victorian
County Court by s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act.
16 It was not clear from the judgment in Pfeiffer v Rogerson which provision conferred federal
jurisdiction on the ACT Supreme Court to determine the constitutional claim in that case in
federal jurisdiction.
17 (2005) 223 CLR 251.
18 Federal jurisdiction to determine the claim in Agtrack was conferred on the Victorian
Supreme Court by s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act.
19 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 514 [2].
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requirements and, thus, there is no scope for conflicting rules
between the Constitution and the common law;20
• Commonwealth legislation also applies by virtue of covering cl 5 to
the Constitution, and prevails over inconsistent State21 and
Territory22 statutes, and the common law; and
• there is one common law in Australia and, consequently, there cannot
be differing common law rules.23
Thus, a choice of law can only arise between Australian sources of law where
the statute of one State modifies the common law, or two State legislatures
have enacted differing statutory rules. Where a State court is not exercising
federal jurisdiction, the first step for a court in selecting the applicable law is
to apply common law choice of law methodology.24 A court of the forum State
law area will apply common law choice of law rules to the characterised issue
in question unless those rules have been modified by statute applicable in the
forum.
However, when the State court is exercising federal jurisdiction, that court
transcends its State law area to become the forum court of a different (federal)
law area. As already indicated, in Pfeiffer v Rogerson, the Court said that the
applicable law is to be identified ‘in accordance with ss 79 and 80 of the
Judiciary Act’. Those sections provide:
Section 79(1):
The laws of each State or Territory, including the laws relating to procedure,
evidence, and the competency of witnesses, shall, except as otherwise provided by
the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth, be binding on all Courts
exercising federal jurisdiction in that State or Territory in all cases to which they are
applicable.
Section 80:
So far as the laws of the Commonwealth are not applicable or so far as their
provisions are insufficient to carry them into effect, or to provide adequate remedies
or punishment, the common law in Australia as modified by the Constitution and by
the statute law in force in the State or Territory in which the Court in which the
jurisdiction is exercised is held shall, so far as it is applicable and not inconsistent
with the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth, govern all Courts
exercising federal jurisdiction in the exercise of their jurisdiction in civil and
criminal matters.
There has been considerable uncertainty as to how ss 79(1) and 80 operate to
identify the applicable law in federal jurisdiction.25 As Professor Lindell has
said, ‘the precise relationship between the provisions ... has been difficult to
20 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.
21 By application of s 109 of the Constitution.
22 By application of repugnancy principles: see Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory
(2013) 250 CLR 441.
23 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520; Lipohar v The Queen
(1999) 200 CLR 485.
24 See the discussion of Sweedman (2006) 226 CLR 362, 398–9 [19] in Justice Mark Leeming,
Resolving Conflicts of Laws (Federation Press, 2011) 211. Depending on the reach of
conflicting State laws, there may be a need for additional analysis to resolve the statutory
conflict: see Sweedman (2006) 226 CLR 362, 405–7 [45]–[52].
25 See, eg, Peter Nygh, ‘Choice of Law in Federal and Cross-vested Jurisdiction’ in Brian R
190 (2018) 46 Australian Bar Review
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discern’.26 Prior to its amendment in 1988, s 80 referred to the ‘common law
of England’. Understandably, in that form, s 80 was eschewed in favour of
s 79 for determining the applicable law.27 Thus, the ‘traditional view’ placed
emphasis on s 79 as picking up the State laws of the forum to the dispute in
question.28 This raised a range of difficulties. Did s 79 apply to all State laws,
substantive and procedural?29 Was it limited to statute, or did it also include
common law rules? If it applied to common law rules, did it also pick up
common law choice of law rules?30 Different views were expressed about
these matters with no clear majority position emerging.
The amendment of s 80 in 1988 to refer to ‘the common law in Australia’,
and the acceptance that there was a single common law of Australia, provided
a platform for a shift in the understanding of the relationship between ss 79
and 80: s 79 could be limited to statutes, with s 80 applying the common law,
perhaps including the common law choice of law rules.
However, this gave rise to difficult questions of sequencing. If s 79 were
applied first to forum statutes, then the forum State court would apply the
legislation of that forum State within the national law area. Substantive
outcomes would differ according to the forum court in which the proceedings
were litigated.31 Even if s 80 were applied first, if the reference to the
‘common law in Australia’ were read as a reference to the substantive or
dispositive common law, then, again, statutory modifications to the common
law operating in the forum would be applied. Substantive outcomes would
again depend on the choice of forum.
It was only if:
(i) s 80 were applied first;
(ii) the reference to the ‘common law in Australia’ in s 80 were read as
referring to the common law choice of law rules; and
(iii) forum neutral choice of law rules were adopted,
that uniformity of outcome across forum courts would be achieved in most
cases. The shift to this approach came in Gaudron J’s judgment in
Commonwealth v Mewett, where her Honour favoured turning first to s 80 to
Opeskin and Fiona Wheeler (eds), The Australian Federal Judicial System (Melbourne
University Press, 2000) 338–46; Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’), The
Judicial Power of the Commonwealth: A Review of the Judiciary Act 1903 and Related
Legislation, Report No 92 (2001) 603–6.
26 Geoffrey Lindell, Cowen and Zines’s Federal Jurisdiction in Australia (Federation Press,
4th ed, 2016) 357.
27 See Commonwealth v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471, 525 (Gaudron J) (‘Mewett’).
28 Nygh, above n 25, 339; see also ALRC, above n 25, 603–4.
29 In Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) v Owens [No 2] (1953) 88 CLR 168, 170, Dixon
CJ seemed to suggest that it applied to all State laws and, prior to Rizeq, that view seemed
to have been generally assumed. However, this view was not universally held. In Mewett
(1997) 191 CLR 471, 492, Brennan CJ seemed to take the view that s 79 was limited to
procedural laws (statute or common law, and including choice of law rules), with s 80 then
picking up ‘the general common law’.
30 This appears to have been the assumed position in Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471, 492
(Brennan CJ), 554 (Gummow and Kirby JJ). See also Musgrave v Commonwealth (1937) 57
CLR 514, 532 (Latham CJ), cf 547–8 (Dixon J), 550–1 (Evatt and McTiernan JJ).
31 Cf Graeme Hill and Andrew Beech SC, ‘“Picking up” State and Territory laws under s 79
of the Judiciary Act — three questions’ (2005) 27 Australian Bar Review 25, 40–1.
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pick up common law choice of law rules.32 In a joint judgment, Gummow and
Kirby JJ also favoured that approach.33 The High Court in Pfeiffer v Rogerson
adopted, as a general rule, the position of Gaudron J from Mewett, and that
position was made clear by the Court in Blunden.34 Section 79 would pick up
State laws as ‘surrogate Commonwealth laws’35 only if needed where s 80
was insufficient to identify the applicable State laws to determine the
dispute.36
The approach accepted in Pfeiffer v Rogerson and Blunden was not a
panacea for all the difficulties of accommodating choice of law rules to federal
jurisdiction. Sections 79 and 80 operated as ‘application laws’37 and, as
Justice Leeming has written extra-curially, ‘application laws are complex, and
there is no reason to expect that their interrelationship with federal jurisdiction
and choice of law will be simple’.38 While the broad frame of the Pfeiffer v
Rogerson methodology was clear, uncertainties remained about the precise
scope of s 79 to supplement the operation of s 80.39 The approach also carried
the baggage of the common law choice of law methodology: ‘choice of law
rules have never coped particularly well with statutory rights’,40 particularly
where State statutes depart from the territorial reach assumed by most choice
of law rules.41 Thus, conceptual difficulties remained following Pfeiffer v
Rogerson and Blunden.
Nonetheless, the conceptual achievement of Pfeiffer v Rogerson within the
common law choice of law methodology was substantial. Drawing from
Gaudron J’s earlier reasoning in Mewett, the decision did much to translate
traditional common law choice of law concepts to the creation of federal
jurisdiction by ch III of the Constitution and to align choice of law in federal
and non-federal jurisdiction. The establishment of the Commonwealth of
Australia was seen as superimposing a new ‘law area’ on the existing State
law areas. Sections 79 and 80 of the Judiciary Act, and their sequencing in
reverse order, were used to accommodate common law choice of law rules to
a judicial structure that permitted the exercise of federal jurisdiction by State
courts. In that way, State statutes could be applied by State courts in their
transcendental role in the national ‘law area’, and the substantive outcomes
could be largely synchronised to those in non-federal jurisdiction.
32 (1997) 191 CLR 471, 522, 525.
33 Ibid 554.
34 Blunden v Commonwealth (2003) 218 CLR 330, 339 [18]; see also Sweedman (2006) 226
CLR 362, 402–3 [33]; Agtrack (2005) 223 CLR 251, 258 [8].
35 Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471, 554 (Gummow and Kirby JJ).
36 See ibid 522 (Gaudron J). See also the operation of s 79(1) in Agtrack (2005) 223 CLR 251
where no common law choice of the law was applicable.
37 That is, laws ‘whose purpose is to make other laws applicable to courts in certain classes of
case when courts are exercising federal jurisdiction’: Justice Mark Leeming, ‘Constitutional
Aspects of Commonwealth and State Application Laws (with special attention to ss 79 and
80 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth))’ (Paper presented to New South Wales Bar Association
Public Law Section, 27 July 2015) 10.
38 Ibid 14.
39 See ibid 11–14; Hill and Beech, above n 31, 40–1.
40 Leeming, ‘Constitutional Aspects of Commonwealth and State Application Laws’,
above n 37, 5.
41 See James Stellios, ‘Choice of Law and the Australian Constitution: Locating the Debate’
(2005) 33 Federal Law Review 7, 34–7.
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In Pfeiffer v Rogerson, these developments combined with the emergence of
a majority, multilateralist preference for achieving certainty, uniformity and
predictability in multi-jurisdictional disputes,42 and the derivation of
constitutional support (perhaps even a constitutional imperative) for the
achievement of such choice of law policies.43 In short, matters arising from
the constitutional text and structure — including the integrated judicial
system, the existence of federal jurisdiction and s 118 of the Constitution —
favoured the adoption of the lex loci delicti as the choice of law rule for torts.44
The work done by ss 79(1) and 80 in choice of law
At least following Pfeiffer v Rogerson (if not earlier), there appeared to be
three important assumptions about how these provisions operated. First, it
seemed to be assumed that both sections had something to say about the
identification of the applicable law in federal jurisdiction. In other words, each
provision played a choice of law role: s 80 utilised common law choice of law
rules to select the lex causae to determine the substantive issue in question,
while, to the extent necessary, s 79(1) selected forum statute law to apply to
the dispute.45
Second, the ‘conventional understanding’46 was that s 79(1) applied to all
State laws — whether substantive or procedural as those classifications are
understood in choice of law. Writing prior to the decision in Pfeiffer v
Rogerson, Professor Nygh said that limiting s 79 to procedural laws was
‘inconsistent with the hitherto accepted basis that it is s 79 that primarily does
the “picking up” of state laws whether procedural or not’.47 Of course,
Pfeiffer v Rogerson reduced the need for s 79(1) to pick up substantive laws,
instead relying on s 80 and the common law choice of law rules to identify the
applicable substantive law. However, the Court’s decision did not disturb that
‘hitherto accepted’ position.
Third, it appeared to be assumed that no State Act could apply in federal
jurisdiction without Commonwealth authorisation. That was said to be a
consequence of an absence of State constitutional power. Sections 79(1) and
80 gave the forum court federal authority to apply State law. Within a private
international law framework, this is readily understandable, and seemed to
follow from the identification of the Commonwealth as a separate law area in
Pfeiffer v Rogerson. In choice of law terms, it is forum law that authorises a
court to apply non-forum law and, in the federal law area, ss 79(1) and 80
were seen as performing that role.
42 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 528 [44], 540 [87] (Gleeson CJ,
Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 550–1 [123] (Kirby J).
43 Ibid 535 [70].
44 Ibid 534–5 [67]–[70].
45 See Hill and Beech, above n 31, 33. These forum laws might have included forum
procedural laws or statutory choice of law rules: see Nygh, above n 25, 340–1, 344;
Leeming, ‘Constitutional Aspects of Commonwealth and State Application Laws’,
above n 37, 10.
46 Leeming, ‘Constitutional Aspects of Commonwealth and State Application Laws’,
above n 37, 1.
47 Nygh, above n 25, 340. See also Lindell, above n 26, 357: ‘the modern view has been to
accept that s 79 covers both procedural and substantive matters’. See further Hill and Beech,
above n 31.
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The decision in Rizeq
The facts of Rizeq were a long way from a choice of law context. However,
the Court’s decision has significant implications for choice of law analysis in
federal jurisdiction. The background to the case can be stated briefly. Mr
Rizeq was a resident of New South Wales. He had been prosecuted in the
District Court of Western Australia for offences against s 6(1)(a) of the Misuse
of Drugs Act 1981 (WA). Because his prosecution involved a matter between
a State and a resident of another State, Mr Rizeq’s prosecution was heard by
the District Court of Western Australia in federal jurisdiction.48 He was
convicted by a majority jury verdict in accordance with s 114(2) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA). If it had been a prosecution on indictment
for a federal offence, s 80 of the Constitution would have required a
unanimous jury verdict, and s 114(2) could not have applied to authorise a
majority verdict.49
However, it was argued that since the prosecution was heard in federal
jurisdiction, the offence provision in s 6(1)(a) could only apply as a ‘surrogate
Commonwealth law’ by virtue of s 79(1) of the Judiciary Act. As there was a
trial on indictment of a surrogate Commonwealth offence, it was contended
that s 80 was enlivened. Consequently, s 114(2) could not be applied by
s 79(1) to authorise a majority verdict.
A unanimous Court rejected the challenge and, in the course of doing so,
reconceptualised the operation of s 79(1) of the Judiciary Act: a provision the
interpretation of which was described by the plurality as ‘plagued at various
turns by metaphor and obscurity of language’.50 The relevant conclusions and
observations from Rizeq are as follows.
First, the decision confirms what was accepted in Pfeiffer v Rogerson that,
with the acceptance of one common law in Australia, s 79(1) ‘can only
meaningfully encompass the statutory laws of each State. There is no common
law of a State on which the section could operate’.51
Second, s 79(1) does not apply to all State statutory laws. It only applies to
State laws that ‘affect [or regulate52 or govern53] the exercise of federal
jurisdiction by a State court’,54 ‘command a State court as to the manner of its
exercise of federal jurisdiction’55 or, in the words of the Chief Justice,
‘regulate matters coming before [courts exercising federal jurisdiction] and to
provide those courts with powers necessary for the hearing or determination
of those matters’56 or are ‘directed to State courts and their powers’.57
Section 79(1) was needed to operate on these laws because the State
Parliaments lack the constitutional power or capacity to enact them. As the
48 That jurisdiction having been conferred by s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act.
49 That position was established in Cheatle v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 541.
50 Rizeq (2017) 344 ALR 421, 439 [77].
51 Ibid 439 [78].
52 Ibid 434 [59].
53 Ibid 435 [63].
54 Ibid 434 [58].
55 Ibid 435 [61]–[62].
56 Ibid 426 [20]. See also laws that ‘provide a court with powers it may exercise in the hearing
and determination of a matter, and in otherwise regulating the proceedings before it’: 425
[11]; ‘laws directed to those courts respecting the matters which might be commenced in
194 (2018) 46 Australian Bar Review
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plurality judgment of Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ said:
The section fills that gap by picking up the text of a State law governing the exercise
of State jurisdiction and applying that text as a Commonwealth law to govern the
manner of exercise of federal jurisdiction. The section has no broader operation.58
By contrast, s 79(1) does not apply to laws that apply ‘independently of
anything done by a court’59 or which are ‘directed to the rights and duties of
persons’.60 Those laws apply of their own force and are not picked up by
s 79(1). The plurality judgment explained that a State Parliament is ‘sustained
as part of the constitution of the State by s 106 [of the Constitution], and
powers of a State Parliament to make laws are sustained by s 107’.61
Consequently, their Honours said, ‘laws made by the Parliament of the
Commonwealth and laws made by the Parliaments of the States form “a single
though composite body of law”’.62 While ch III of the Constitution makes
provision for an ‘integrated national court system’, it:
does nothing to undermine the singularity or integrity of the composite body of
Commonwealth and State law for which Chs I [which contains the source of
Commonwealth legislative power] and V [which preserves State legislative power]
and s 122 of the Constitution [the territories power] make principal provision.63
Their Honours observed:
The simple constitutional truth is that State laws form part of the single composite
body of federal and non-federal law that is applicable to cases determined in the
exercise of federal jurisdiction in the same way, and for the same reason, as they
form part of the same single composite body of law that is applicable to cases
determined in the exercise of State jurisdiction — because they are laws.64
Mr Rizeq’s submissions were premised on the incapacity of State Parliaments
to prescribe the laws to be applied in federal jurisdiction. The Court accepted
that there is a State constitutional incapacity, but it only extends to the
enactment of laws that affect the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Section 79(1)
operates to fill the gap of that narrower incapacity of State constitutional
power.
Third, the operation of s 79(1) is not to be defined by reference to the choice
of law distinction between substantive and procedural laws.65 Indeed, the
plurality said that ‘[i]t would be wrong ... to seek to delimit the scope of the
section’s operation by invoking the difficult and sometimes elusive distinction
them, the processes to be applied in hearing them and orders made in determination of
them’: 425 [13]; ‘law governing when and how a court exercising federal jurisdiction is to
hear and determine a matter’: 426 [17].
57 Ibid 428 [28].
58 Ibid 435 [63]. See also ibid 442–3 [90]–[92] (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ),
425 [15] (Kiefel CJ). In a separate judgment, Edelman J preferred a different interpretation
of s 79(1) to that adopted by the other judges. I will return to that view briefly below.
59 Ibid 446 [105].
60 Ibid 426 [20].
61 Ibid 431 [47]. Except to the extent that such powers are given exclusively to the
Commonwealth or withdrawn from the States.
62 Ibid 431 [48].
63 Ibid 431 [49].
64 Ibid 433 [56].
65 Ibid.
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between “substance” and “procedure”’.66 I will return to this point below.
Fourth, the scope of s 80 of the Judiciary Act, and its relationship to s 79(1),
were questions left open by the Court.67
For Mr Rizeq, the consequence was that s 6(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs
Act operated of its own force in federal jurisdiction and, thus, s 80 of the
Constitution was not enlivened. Consequently, s 114(2) of the Criminal
Procedure Act was not affected in this case by the requirements of s 80. Since
it was a provision that affected the exercise of federal jurisdiction, its
application required the operation of s 79(1) of the Judiciary Act.
Implications of Rizeq for choice of law
The full implications for choice of law in federal jurisdiction are not easy to
see. Most clearly, s 79(1) is no longer to play a role in the identification of the
law to be applied in federal jurisdiction. To that extent, the statement of five
judges in Pfeiffer v Rogerson has been qualified. It now operates to fill the
lacuna in constitutional power for forum State legislatures to regulate the
exercise of federal jurisdiction. However, this shift in the understanding of the
role of s 79(1) creates some difficulties for choice of law analysis in federal
jurisdiction and the relationship between ss 79(1) and 80 that was established
in Pfeiffer v Rogerson.
Difficulties created by rejection of substance vs procedure
distinction
As already indicated, the pre-Rizeq position appeared to be that s 79(1)
operated on all State laws (whether substantive or procedural). However, in a
choice of law context, s 79(1) largely (although not exclusively) operated to
pick up State laws that applied to issues characterised as procedural in
character.68 In choice of law analysis, a law’s application to an issue depends
upon its characterisation as substantive or procedural. In Pfeiffer v Rogerson,
the Court modernised the approach to substance vs procedure: substantive
matters are those that ‘affect the existence, extent or enforceability of the
rights or duties of the parties to an action’;69 whereas procedural matters are
those ‘which are directed to governing or regulating the mode or conduct of
court proceedings’.70
Prior to Rizeq, the position seemed to be that the law applicable to
substantive issues was determined in federal jurisdiction, through the
operation of s 80, by identifying the choice of law rule applicable to the
category or classification of the issue in question. Where there was no
applicable choice of law rule, then s 79(1) directed the application of forum
law. Thus, procedural questions, which the Court in Pfeiffer v Rogerson
accepted ‘were not the subject of choice of law rules’,71 would be dealt with
by s 79(1) identifying and picking up forum law.
66 Ibid 441 [83]. See also ibid 426 [19] (Kiefel CJ).
67 Ibid 425 [14] (Kiefel CJ), 439 [79] (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).
68 See, eg, Nygh, above n 25, 340–1, 344; Lindell, above n 26, 357.
69 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 543 [99].
70 Ibid 543–4 [99], quoting Mason CJ in McKain (1991) 174 CLR 1, 26–7.
71 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 528 [46].
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However, as already indicated, the Court in Rizeq has disapproved of
discerning the scope of s 79(1) by using the substance/procedure distinction.
As has been explained, s 79(1) only operates on State laws that ‘affect the
exercise of federal jurisdiction by a State court’: it does not apply to State laws
that apply ‘independently of anything done by a court’. In identifying the type
of laws that would be covered by s 79(1), the plurality said that it was ‘more
useful’72 to consider the distinction between ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘power’:
s 79(1) would apply to laws conferring ‘powers’ on a court to be exercised
within the court’s ‘jurisdiction’.73 For example, the plurality referred to a
power conferred by State legislation on a State court to make civil penalty
orders as a provision that required the operation of s 79(1).74 The plurality
continued:
Other examples derived from the cases of laws within the purview of s 79 of the
Judiciary Act include laws: which regulate the procedure of the court; which limit
the court’s powers to compel production of documents or disclosure of information;
which bar the court absolutely or conditionally by reason of effluxion of time from
entertaining a claim; which require or permit the court to stay a proceeding where
there has been a submission to arbitration; and which confer authority on the court
in specified circumstances to make orders conferring or declaring or altering rights
or status. That list is indicative, not exhaustive.75
Other examples referred to included:
• State court powers to make orders concerning the welfare and
custody of children;76
• State laws governing the assessment and apportionment of
compensation;77
• State court powers to make remedial orders;78 and
• State provisions entitling a tortfeasor to recover contribution from
another tortfeasor in an amount which was determined by a court to
be ‘just and equitable’.79
What is important, for present purposes, is to recognise that many of these
issues would be identified, within a choice of law analysis, as substantive in
character. For example, statutes of limitation and provisions capping the
assessment of damages were considered in Pfeiffer v Rogerson to be
substantive.80 Through s 80 of the Judiciary Act, common law choice of law
rules would identify the law to be applied. However, since those provisions are
likely to be seen as regulating the exercise of jurisdiction, the State
Parliaments would lack the capacity to enact such laws for federal jurisdiction:
s 79(1) would be required. If the choice of law rule identified forum law as
72 Rizeq (2017) 344 ALR 421, 441 [84].
73 Ibid 441–2 [84]–[87].
74 In this respect, the plurality referred to Forge v Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (2006) 228 CLR 45, 90–1 [112].
75 Rizeq (2017) 344 ALR 421, 442 [89] (citations omitted).
76 R v Oregan; Ex parte Oregan (1957) 97 CLR 323.
77 Parker v Commonwealth (1965) 112 CLR 295.
78 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204
CLR 559.
79 Austral Pacific Group Ltd v Airservices Australia (2000) 203 CLR 136 (‘Austral Pacific’).
80 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 544 [100].
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applicable, then s 79(1) could operate, complementarily, to pick up the forum
law regulating jurisdiction. But, if the choice of law rule identified a
non-forum law, then s 79(1) can offer no assistance. It cannot operate to pick
up non-forum law, and since it would not be a case to which forum law was
‘applicable’, then s 79(1), by its own terms, could not pick up forum law.
This, in fact, presents a problem for the choice of law outcome in Pfeiffer v
Rogerson. The question in that case was whether the damages caps in the
Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) were to be applied by the ACT
Supreme Court to a tort claim in circumstances where the tort occurred in New
South Wales. Questions about the amount of damages were held to be
‘substantive issues governed by the lex loci delicti’,81 and s 80 obliged the
Supreme Court to apply the NSW provisions.82 But, the NSW provisions
provided that ‘[a] court may not award damages to a person contrary to the
Division’ and other provisions gave ‘content’ to that prohibition by
prescribing the way in which damages were to be quantified.83 The NSW
statute was read as if it were addressed to the ACT Supreme Court.84 Under
a Rizeq analysis, such provisions would regulate the exercise of federal
jurisdiction and, to operate in federal jurisdiction, would need to be given life
by s 79(1). Indeed, the Court in Pfeiffer v Rogerson considered that s 79(1)
would operate to pick up those provisions if they were being applied by a
NSW court exercising federal jurisdiction or a federal court.85 But, in
Pfeiffer v Rogerson, the relevant court was an ACT court and the choice of law
rules picked up by s 80 identified the NSW provision as applicable. Since
non-forum law was involved, s 79(1) could not apply to those provisions.
Other fact patterns also demonstrate this difficulty, for example, if, having
applied a choice of law rule under s 80, a forum court looks to a non-forum
law area only to find a statutory rejection of its application to the dispute in
question. Take, for example, a variation of the legislative provisions
considered by the High Court in Akai Pty Ltd v People’s Insurance Co Ltd.86
The question in that case was whether the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth)
applied to an insurance policy containing a choice of law clause providing that
‘[t]his policy shall be governed by the laws of England’. Section 8(1) of the
Insurance Contracts Act provided that:
the application of this Act extends to contracts of insurance and proposed contracts
of insurance the proper law of which is or would be the law of a State or the law of
a Territory in which this Act applies or to which this Act extends.
However, to avoid circumvention of the Insurance Contracts Act, s 8(2)
provided that:
where the proper law of a contract or proposed contract would, but for an express
provision to the contrary included ... in the contract ... be the law of a State or of a
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid 544 [103].
83 Ibid 516 [11].
84 Cf as to a choice of law clause in a voluntary settlement in Augustus v Permanent Trustee
Co (Canberra) Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 245, 259 (Walsh J).
85 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 516 [11].
86 (1996) 188 CLR 418.
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Territory in which this Act applies ... then, notwithstanding that provision, the proper
law of the contract is the law of that State or Territory.
Assume that s 8 was a non-forum State provision (State A) and that the forum
State (State B) had no such provision. Assume further that, in determining a
dispute about the insurance contract, a State B court, applying s 80, gives
effect to a choice of law clause selecting the law of State A. But, in effect, the
statute law of State A would operate (where the proper law of contract would
be State B if not for the choice of law clause) to modify the outcome of
applying the forum choice of law rule. If the non-forum law of State A
displacing the operation of the common law choice of law rule were
characterised as regulating the jurisdiction of the State A court, how is it to be
picked up? Arguably, such a law could not apply of its own force and, since
it is not a forum law, s 79(1) would provide no assistance. Indeed, this
hypothetical could arise in relation to State insurance contracts. New South
Wales has applied the Insurance Contracts Act to State insurance contracts.87
However, Victoria has not. Thus, the hypothetical could arise if a Victorian
court were the forum court considering a claim under a State insurance policy
which selected NSW law as the applicable law but, in relation to which, the
proper law of contract would be Victoria but for the choice of law clause.
These difficulties have been created because of the discordance between the
substance/procedure distinction which controls the operation of s 80, and the
new Rizeq distinction that controls the operation of s 79(1).
Difficulties created at the margin of the new Rizeq
distinction for the operation of s 79(1)
These difficulties are amplified when dealing with non-forum provisions that
straddle the new Rizeq distinction. The conferral of a power on a court to
create a right is a common drafting technique. A Commonwealth provision
containing such a function is rationalised alongside the Commonwealth
separation of judicial power principles by reading those provisions as
simultaneously creating a right and conferring a power on a court to determine
the existence of that right.88 On the Rizeq analysis, a non-forum State law of
that kind could not apply of its own force and, as has been discussed, s 79(1)
could not pick it up as a federal law.
The difficulty extends further to separate provisions which, respectively,
create a right and confer a power on a court. This was made clear in the Rizeq
Court’s analysis of Austral Pacific Group Ltd v Airservices Australia.89 That
case considered whether the defendant to claims for tort and under the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) in the District Court of Queensland could claim a
right of contribution under ss 6 and 7 of the Law Reform Act 1995 (Qld).
While Austral Pacific was not a choice of law case, it was a case in federal
jurisdiction since the third party against whom contribution was sought,
Airservices Australia, was considered to be the Commonwealth for the
87 See Insurance (Application of Laws) Act 1986 (NSW).
88 See, recently, James Stellios, ‘The Masking of Judicial Power Values: Historical Analogies
and Double Function Provisions’ (2017) 28 Public Law Review 138.
89 (2000) 203 CLR 136.
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purposes of s 75(iii) of the Constitution.90 Consequently, it was assumed by
the High Court in Austral Pacific that the recovery provisions in the
Queensland Act would have to be picked up by s 79(1). Section 6 of the
Queensland Act created the right to recover contribution from a joint
tortfeasor and s 7 conferred a power on a court to determine the amount of
contribution that was ‘just and equitable’. Both were considered by the High
Court in Austral Pacific to require the operation of s 79(1) even though s 6,
on its face, looked like a provision that created a right. The High Court in
Rizeq explained this result in the following way:
The s 6 right is inseparable from the s 7 power. Neither is therefore capable of
applying in federal jurisdiction as State law. Both are within the field of operation
of s 79 of the Judiciary Act.91
But, as has already been explained, in a choice of law context, that outcome
creates difficulties when such State laws are substantive non-forum laws that
have been identified through choice of law rules under s 80. They cannot
operate of their own force, but cannot be picked up by s 79(1). The point can
be made further by returning to Pfeiffer v Rogerson, where the NSW
provisions placed an obligation on a court not to assess damages contrary to
the Act and gave ‘content’ to that prohibition by prescribing the way in which
damages were to be quantified. These too are likely to be seen as
‘inseparable’, in which case how were any of the applicable NSW provisions
picked up to regulate the ACT Supreme Court’s exercise of federal
jurisdiction?
It was, in part, because of these kinds of difficulties that Edelman J in Rizeq
preferred a construction that:
the laws to which s 79(1) refers are only those statutory laws which govern or
regulate the powers that a court (in this case, a State court) exercises as part of its
authority to decide.92
Difficulties where there are extra-territorial non-forum laws
Difficulties also arise where a non-forum law, which is capable of applying by
its own force, operates extra-jurisdictionally within the forum State. A
variation of the fact pattern in Sweedman93 illustrates this point. The question
that arose in Sweedman was the identification of the law to be applied to the
enforcement of a statutory indemnity created under s 104(1) of the Transport
Accident Act 1986 (Vic). Because the Court was exercising federal
jurisdiction, that characterisation process had to be undertaken through the
lens of s 80 of the Judiciary Act. The statutory indemnity arose under the
statutory compensation scheme established by the Transport Accident Act.
The entitlement to indemnity accrued following the payment by the Transport
Accident Commission from the statutory fund to the owners of a Victorian
registered vehicle (the Suttons) involved in an accident in New South Wales.
90 The District Court having been invested with federal jurisdiction to determine a claim of that
type under s 39(2) of the Judiciary Act.
91 Rizeq v Western Australia (2017) 344 ALR 421, 445 [100].
92 Ibid 449 [120]. See also ibid 447–8 [111], 448–9 [116]–[118], 469–70 [193]–[197].
93 Sweedman v Transport Accident Commission (2006) 226 CLR 362.
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What is relevant for present purposes is that, instead of the claim for
statutory compensation under the Victorian scheme, the Suttons might have
claimed tort damages in a NSW court. If they had, the NSW court, again in
federal jurisdiction as the plaintiffs and defendant were residents of different
States, would have applied the lex loci delicti through s 80 of the Judiciary
Act. Prima facie, the common law of negligence (subject to NSW statutory
modifications), which was applicable in New South Wales, would have
applied to the dispute since the accident occurred in New South Wales.
However, following Rizeq, the position becomes more complicated. It is
likely that the compensation provisions in the Victorian Act, which formed
part of an administrative payment scheme, would have operated
‘independently of anything done by a court’ and, following Rizeq, would have
applied of their own force in federal jurisdiction. The Victorian compensation
statute would be ‘in force’ in New South Wales for the purposes of s 80 and,
arguably, would displace the operation of the common law choice of law rule
for tort in relation to accidents occurring in New South Wales involving a car
registered in Victoria.94
Difficulties where there are no choice of law rules
There are also difficulties where s 80 does not operate because there is no
common law choice of law rule. Following Rizeq, there will be difficulties in
those circumstances in choosing between competing State statutes. Take, for
example, revenue and penal laws in relation to which ‘the common law has
never derived a choice of law rule’.95 Section 80 could not supply a
connecting rule to identify the applicable law.
Prior to Rizeq, s 79(1) identified forum revenue or penal law as applicable
and operated to pick up those laws in federal jurisdiction. After Rizeq,
depending on their form, such laws may not regulate the jurisdiction of a
court: typically they might apply ‘independently of anything done by a court’.
Such laws are now to apply in federal jurisdiction of their own force.
However, if there is more than one such law potentially applicable, how would
a State court choose between them? Section 79(1) is no longer seen as
performing a choice of law function.
Constitutional difficulties for the operation of s 79(1) in a
choice of law context
The new Rizeq conception of s 79(1) may create constitutional difficulties
under s 118 of the Constitution. As explained, by its terms, s 79(1) only
operates to provide federal authority for courts, State and federal, to pick up
forum State jurisdictional provisions. Such an operation may fail to give
non-forum laws, that are otherwise applicable, full, faith and credit as required
by s 118. These difficulties largely were avoided when s 79(1) operated, in a
choice of law context, primarily to pick up procedural laws. However, as
explained, the Rizeq distinction for the operation of s 79(1) now catches a
range of provisions that deal with substantive issues.
94 For a similar point, see Lindell, above n 26, 380.
95 Adrian Briggs, The Conflict of Laws (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2013) 205.
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A more fundamental challenge to the Pfeiffer v Rogerson
methodology for choice of law
Lurking within the Court’s reasoning in Rizeq might be a more fundamental
challenge to the very foundation of the Pfeiffer v Rogerson choice of law
methodology. As already mentioned, in Pfeiffer v Rogerson, it was said that,
‘with respect to matters that fall within federal jurisdiction, the
Commonwealth of Australia is, itself, a law area’.96 The question of what laws
were to be applied within that national law area involved ‘the identification of
the applicable law’, rather than a ‘choice between laws of competing
jurisdictions’, and the identification of the applicable law was to proceed by
way of ss 79 and 80.97 As also indicated, in Rizeq, the plurality said that the
Constitution itself provides for Commonwealth and State laws forming ‘a
single though composite body of law’, and that nothing in ch III undermines
‘the singularity or integrity of [that] composite body ... of law’.98
While these observations in Rizeq are not inconsistent with the recognition
in Pfeiffer v Rogerson of separate law areas, including a superimposed
Commonwealth law area, those law areas are no longer defined by reference
to the laws of the respective State legislatures of those law areas. Instead, the
State laws that fall outside s 79(1) form part of a composite body of ‘law’ that
is applied, by operation of the Constitution, across law areas.
Arguably, the entire enterprise of connecting legal disputes to law areas to
identify the applicable law, the very purpose of applying common law choice
of law rules, comes under challenge. Just as a uniform common law applies
across law areas without the need for choice of law, a composite body of ‘law’
may be seen as operating in the same way. And, in the case of State statutes
outside s 79(1), the Rizeq Court has indicated that they are applicable of their
own force in federal jurisdiction by operation of the Constitution: s 80 is not
necessary as federal authority for courts to apply State laws in federal
jurisdiction. Indeed, such a fundamental challenge to the choice of law
framework would extend beyond federal jurisdiction to non-federal choice of
law contexts involving the choice of one State statute over another.
Of course, a court — whether exercising federal or non-federal
jurisdiction — would still need to identify which State statute should be
applied over another, and choice of law rules might operate to inform that
exercise. However, they need not. Other methods for the identification of
applicable State laws might focus on the reach of the respective statutes that
comprise this composite body of ‘law’.99 In familiar choice of law language,
a unilateralist approach to choice of law which looks to the reach of State
statutes over the dispute can operate instead of a multilateralist approach of
connecting the dispute to a law area.
The Court did not go this far: it was not a choice of law case. However, the
96 John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 514 [2].
97 Ibid 530 [53].
98 Rizeq v Western Australia (2017) 344 ALR 421, 431 [48]–[49] (emphasis added).
99 See, eg, Stephen Gageler, ‘Private Intra-national Law: Choice or Conflict, Common Law or
Constitution?’ (2003) 23 Australian Bar Review 184; Jeremy Kirk, ‘Conflicts and Choice of
Law within the Australian Constitutional Context’ (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 247;
Stellios, ‘Choice of Law and the Australian Constitution’, above n 41.
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shift to the idea of a composite body of ‘law’ applying of its own force by
operation of the overarching constitutional framework does sit uncomfortably
with the common law private international law framework which is premised
on different sources of law applying in separate law areas. Two final
comments may be made in this respect. First, the shift to a constitutional
foundation to explain the application of non-forum State law might reflect a
concern that choice of law in federal jurisdiction should not depend on the
Commonwealth Parliament enacting statutory provisions. Second, the full,
faith and credit command in s 118 may yet have some further role to play in
that constitutional foundation.100 It might provide a clearer conceptual basis
for why State laws apply of their own force across federal and State
jurisdictions.
Conclusion
While Rizeq was not a choice of law case, undoubtedly it has choice of law
implications.101 Those implications might be limited to the reconfiguration of
s 79(1) in choice of law cases heard in federal jurisdiction. The gaps that have
been created may well require a judicial reconfiguration of s 80 or the
common law choice of law rules that are applied by s 80, and/or legislative
reform to the way in which s 79(1) is now seen as operating. However, Rizeq
may present a more fundamental challenge to the entire common law choice
of law enterprise. If so, then Pfeiffer v Rogerson will need to be reconsidered.
Of course, the common law method of choice of law rules cannot be
discarded entirely. There will remain questions about the application of
foreign law to a dispute litigated in an Australian court. That will be so even
if the dispute is litigated in federal jurisdiction. There are many contexts in
which choice of law disputes in federal jurisdiction will have connections with
a foreign law area. To take one example, Habib v Commonwealth,102 had it
proceeded to trial, would have involved an action against the Commonwealth
alleging tortious conduct by Commonwealth officers in a foreign jurisdiction.
At least to that extent, s 80 of the Judiciary Act will need to have continuing
operation in the application of the common law choice of law framework in
federal jurisdiction. If Rizeq represents a shift in the conceptual basis for the
resolution of choice of law in intra-national disputes, choice of law analysis in
Australia will be splintered depending upon whether the law in question is a
State law or a foreign law.
100 Ibid.
101 As Justice Leeming has said, ‘A moment’s thought makes it clear that choice of law cannot
be put to one side when considering ss 79 and 80’: Leeming, ‘Constitutional Aspects of
Commonwealth and State Application Laws’, above n 37, 10.
102 (2010) 183 FCR 62.
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